Growing criticism of Chinese engagement in Africa centres on the risk to African development posed by China's aggressive export policies and the threat to the Washington Consensus and African governance posed by China's 'non-interference' approach to engagement. This article challenges both these assumptions. The growth of Chinese trade has a wide range of impacts, depending on the sector in question, and the current terms of trade Washington extends to Africa under the auspices of the AGOA do not result in uniformly beneficial effects. With regard to African governance, it is argued that the 'Washington Consensus' has been based on competing and often muddled perceptions of US national interest. This fact tempers the regret felt at Washington's loss of influence over the good governance agenda. Evidence is provided to show that China can work within properly regulated countries and industries, if the African governments in question can provide fair, efficient and transparent environments in which to operate.
governance, none of the programmes or institutions of the western model has yet been ultimately successful in improving the lot of ordinary Africans in any durable way. This article will examine the impact of both Beijing and Washington on the two areas of trade preferences with Africa, and supporting the governance agenda in Africa.
There is a real urgency surrounding both of these issues because African governments at last hold some measure of influence. They have valuable assets to offer both the US superpower and the rising giant of China -each of whom need access to the resources of the continent, but both of whom also look to the African continent as one source of their diplomatic prestige. This may be more apparent in Beijing's determined courting of African governments and its insistence on their adherence to the 'One China' policy, but there is a powerful contingent within the American foreign policy making apparatus -and in American society itself -that has not abandoned America's sense of mission, and its firmly held belief in American exceptionalism. The investigation will turn initially to American trade preferences towards Africa, and their impact on Africa's ability to improve domestic manufacturing and export diversification. The focus is on the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which represents the type of favourable market access that African governments and development specialists have long been requesting. This is then followed by an analysis of the threats -or opportunities -that the rise of China might pose in this area.
Part I The US, China and African Trade
Seizing the day: The AGOA and the impact of trade preferences
As western economies contracted in the wake of the global economic crash, the developing world faced a sudden evaporation of export markets combined with a virtual cessation of capital inflows to Africa in particular. And yet Kapstein argues that, in 'one of the great ironies of history', Africa could emerge from the global recession as the only region that remains committed to global capitalism. 3 This stems from a realization that one result of the crisis has been an increase in protectionism.
Over recent decades the goal of trade liberalization has proved successful, in that tariffs on goods have declined from a worldwide average of over 25 per cent in 1980
to less than ten per cent today. 4 Unfortunately, reports from both the World Trade American' legislation has since been aborted). 5 Protectionism reduces trade and imposes costs on those who instigate it, but for Africa, with its small domestic markets, the rise of protectionism through increased trade barriers to developed country markets is 'potentially deadly'. 6 There is a small ray of hope with regard to these trade barriers. In The Bottom Billion,
Collier identifies export diversification as being a significant factor in promoting African growth. Competing globally in an export market, rather than in domestic monopolies, really does improve the productivity of African firms, but the problem remains how to get these firms over the initial starting 'hump' of competitiveness. who are in the vanguard of this activity. In fact, these companies are under no obligation to export their oil back into China, and they can sell it to wherever they can get the highest price. As a Chinese mining supervisor explains: 'China is so far away, expensive to get to. I would rather just deliver the money'. 16 A number of further considerations are making Africans question whether their initial indiscriminate enthusiasm for Chinese involvement was misplaced. The huge influx of Chinese companies means that some of China's own low standards of employment are also being imported along with the Chinese workforce. 17 It should be noted that many African companies, particularly small to medium-sized operations, also have a well-established record of flouting employment laws, but the sheer scale of Chinese involvement has helped to maintain a downward pressure on both wages and workers'
rights. In addition to these factors, Taylor points to the issue of Chinese intellectual theft, whereby Chinese immigrants are copying traditional African designsparticularly in the textile market -manufacturing them from cheap materials, and then undercutting the indigenous manufacturers and the traders at the local markets. 18 It is clear that the rapid nature of China's engagement has brought a number of negative consequences to the African continent. Throughout the continent, however, the impact of Chinese trade on individual African countries and sectors is not uniform.
African trade: the case for China
It is important to distinguish between both the competitive and complementary impacts of Chinese imports and exports. Some scenarios are synergistic: for countries producing goods that Africa exports and China imports there will be a significant gain. This largely refers to the hard commodity and oil exporters such as Nigeria, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland. A disadvantageous scenario will also arise in sectors where both China and Africa compete to import the same goods. This is especially the case with hard commodities -most particularly oil -and African importers will be certain to suffer from the upward pressure on world prices caused by China's soaring demand. 19 As these varied impacts show, it is possible to forward a more balanced approach to what the rise of China might mean. Ngaire Woods quotes an OECD study which concludes that there is some evidence that countries with increased trade and aid links with China have higher growth rates, better terms of trade, increased export volumes and higher public revenues. 20 There also appears to be less of a disconnect between China's aid and trade policies. Alden identifies these factors as reflecting China's 'carefully constructed foreign policy of 'rayonnement', or 'overarching brilliance'. 21 In a short space of time, China has successfully matched the western development actors, and has framed its cooperation in terms of solidarity. In South Africa, for example, a sharp rise in Chinese clothing imports has been blamed for the crisis in that country's clothing industry. The Chinese response has been to fund a US$2.5 million training programme in South Africa's garment industry, and to promise preferential loans to assist the modernization of the textile industry. 22 This aspect of policy in particular has been well received in the recipient countries. It is also possible that China's aid and investment can provide the right conditions for Africa's 'take off':
Chinese factories offer not only jobs -they also use production technologies that African entrepreneurs can easily adopt…African elites keep some 40 per cent of their wealth outside the continent, far more than the Asian average of only 6 per cent. Chinese firms…could offer incentives for some of that wealth to return to a capital-starved region. 23 Beijing's rejection of the former colonizing powers' patronizing approach to Africa, together with its inclusion of a significant trade and investment programme, demonstrates that it intends China's role as donor to contrast with the donors of the West: a 'silent revolution' in development assistance. 24 The Washington Consensus was being questioned even before the global economic crisis hit. The system of Anglo Saxon free-market capitalism was being challenged as a reflection of western excesses that was neither sustainable nor possible for recipient governments to follow. This was in contrast to the relatively insulated Chinese economy which appears to offer hope as a model to developing countries today. As For as long as a belief in American exceptionalism persists, however, any evidence of the benign nature of certain elements of Chinese engagement will hold little comfort.
Improved economic circumstances in Africa are clearly desirable, but not necessarily at the cost of Washington's influence.
Part II The US, China and African Governance
The Chinese threat to good governance China's rapid rise as a significant actor in the arena of African development prompted much concern in Washington in particular, with observers damning its interference in the strongest possible terms. China's toxic aid was, it was argued, about to undermine all the years of careful progress that had been nurtured by the Washington model of conditional assistance. Kagan warned that China's policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient states was amounting to an 'informal league of dictators'.
Well-documented dealings with the brutal regime of al-Bashir in the Sudan and
China's funding of controversial patrol boats in the delta region of Nigeria have all been reasonable grounds for concern in the West.
Within Africa too, China has been heavily criticised for its lack of transparency and disregard for human rights which some argue has led directly to maintenance of dictators in power, and the avoidance of true development. 25 It is not difficult to see why dictators might welcome some of China's actions, even while they are rejected by African civil society. Certainly, China's initial pride in its 'no strings attached' Initially, the Chinese government was perfectly happy to weather the criticism, because they were determined to maintain a policy of non-interference. As
Pambazuka reported, Chinese diplomats were proud to announce: 'Non-intervention is our brand, like intervention is the Americans' brand'. 26 Politically illiberal China provides an example of notable economic success, 'which stands in stark contrast to the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus' 27 and could leave Washington with significantly reduced leverage on the African continent. Indeed, a lack of ideological zeal has been one of China's greatest assets in its meteoric rise in development circles. The wisdom of Deng Xiaoping's recommendation that China's foreign policy should include a focus on '…maintaining a low profile, [and] never claim[ing] leadership…' stands in contrast to the often clumsy and sometimes counterproductive attempts of the West, and the US in particular, to champion its own ideological vision through its development assistance. 28 Advocates of the Washington Consensus model, however, warn that far worse outcomes will result if the western model of development assistance is replaced by a 'Beijing Consensus' holding sway in Africa. 29 Washington's argument was that the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) had come some way in pursuing their carefully constructed 'good governance' agenda and that the conditionality underpinning many of the development programmes was crucial in strengthening support for this goal. In fact, the Chinese have found it necessary to step back from their trumpeted policy of non-interference, most notably on the Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Beijing has grown increasingly sensitive to the criticism levelled at it by the rest of the international community for its dealings with these pariah states, and this has had an effect on the direction of its engagement. Even more to the point, however, was the fact that Beijing soon came to realise that doing business with governments that were suffering from endemic corruption and instability did not make for good investment conditions. The whole development agenda has become more complex for Beijing as they come to the realization that a basic level of stability and integrity is desirable among recipient governments.
The Washington Consensus -what is at risk?
The Washington Consensus places great emphasis on economic and political freedom. It has been in this context -the decline of American popularity, the economic crash and especially the rise of an alternative donor approach as represented by China -that the Washington Consensus has been so badly damaged.
The arguments for supporting the West's good governance agenda become weaker the more scrutiny they undergo. It would be impossible to argue against the need for improvements in African governance, but the programmes put in place to improve governance have, all too often, been weak, ineffectual, and undermined by conflicting vested interests from donors and recipients alike. As Brautigam explains, 'Critics described the process as an elaborate charade: aid recipients pretending to reform, and donors pretending to believe them'. there is also evidence to show that some corrupt politicians have a vested interest in maintaining the situation. 46 In addition to this, the infrastructure -both physical and bureaucratic -necessary to facilitate business activities is severely compromised through inept or corrupt governance. Despite huge gas and coal reserves, Nigeria can only manage to generate around half of the power needed to meet domestic demand.
In February Beijing Consensus has given African statesmen and women a measure of influence over their own destinies. Concern over these competing influences has, however, cast a spotlight on the fact that neither agenda will provide Africa with a definitive path to development. Any benefit offered by China's increased involvement on the continent is contingent upon there being a sufficiently transparent and efficient government and bureaucracy in place to oversee it. Although it is argued that it is this very system that the influence of Beijing would threaten, the competing agendas of Washington policy makers have also failed to secure it. China's role as development partner is likely to follow the pattern set by Washington. Trade preferences and aid programmes will only be furthered in as far as they meet a donor's interests -and no significant assistance will be offered by either power in sectors of the economy which may compromise donor interests.
The renewed element of competition which has been introduced onto the development agenda ought to provide African governments with some degree of autonomy in the international sphere, but it also increases their responsibility. If Africa is to capitalize on this limited window of opportunity, it needs a generation of leaders and parliamentarians who are prepared to build an environment conducive to investment and to the support of local industry. If countries across the continent continue to be blighted by the scourge of corruption, infrastructure will be undermined as funds are channelled away from its improvement. Bureaucracy will continue to act as a brake, rather than a facilitator for growth, and the competing influence of the US and China on the continent will remain academic for Africa's people while governments provide an environment which allows either country to harvest what it can from Africa with little regard to the citizens of the continent.
The small chance offered by the newly introduced element of competition between America's and China's development agendas means that, despite their ultimate focus on their own national interest, these powerful donor states might be more inclined to offer some compromises to recipient governments in order to secure these same national interests. This unique opportunity means that there are more chances to bargain and potentially more gains to be had from the development paths offered by either power. And yet, regardless of this, some African governments might choose to ensure that their citizens continue to benefit from neither. 48 
